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Judging by Numbers: Judicial Analytics,
the Justice System and its Stakeholders

This article considers the future of judicial analytics, its possible effects for the
public, the judiciary and the legal profession, and potential responses to the rise
of judicial analytics in Canada. Judicial analytics involves the use of advanced
technologies, like machine learning and natural language processing, to quickly
analyze publicly-available data about judges and judicial decision-making. While,
in Canada, judicial analytics tools are as yet at the early stages of development
and use, such tools are likely to become more powerful, more accurate and more
accessible in the near-to-medium future, resulting in unprecedented public insight
into judges and the work of judging. This article identifies benefits of mainstreamed
judicial analytics, including increased transparency into the work of judging,
and risks flowing from the rise of judicial analytics, including the propagation of
inaccurate or misleading information about judges. In light of these benefits and
risks, the article identifies voluntary third-party certification and the production of
credible public tools as meaningful responses to the rise of judicial analytics and
calls on judicial regulators to consider how information made available through
judicial analytics tools may influence their work.

Cet article examine l’avenir de l’analyse judiciaire, ses effets possibles sur le
public, la magistrature et la profession juridique, et les réponses possibles à la
montée de l’analyse judiciaire au Canada. L’analyse judiciaire implique l’utilisation
de technologies avancées, comme l’apprentissage automatique et le traitement
du langage naturel, pour analyser rapidement les données accessibles au public
au sujet des juges et des décisions judiciaires. Bien qu’au Canada, les outils
d’analyse judiciaire n’en soient encore qu’aux premiers stades de développement
et d’utilisation, il est probable que ces outils deviendront plus puissants, plus précis
et plus accessibles dans un avenir proche ou moyen, ce qui permettra au public
d’avoir une vision sans précédent des juges et de leur travail. Cet article identifie
les avantages de l’analyse judiciaire généralisée, notamment la transparence
accrue du travail des juges, et les risques découlant de l’essor de l’analyse
judiciaire, notamment la propagation d’informations inexactes ou trompeuses au
sujet des juges. À la lumière de ces avantages et de ces risques, l’article identifie
la certification volontaire par une tierce partie et la production d’outils publics
crédibles comme des réponses significatives à l’essor de l’analyse judiciaire et
appelle les régulateurs judiciaires à considérer comment les informations rendues
disponibles par les outils d’analyse judiciaire peuvent influencer leur travail.

*
Jena McGill and Amy Salyzyn are Associate Professors at the University of Ottawa, Faculty
of Common Law. The authors would like to thank Benjamin Alarie, Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell,
Jonathan Khan and two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts. This
article was prepared with financial support from the Ontario Early Researchers Award program and
the SSHRC-funded Autonomy Through Cyberjustice Technologies (ACT) project.

250 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I. What is judicial analytics?
II. The limits of current legal analytics tools
III. The rise of mainstreamed judicial analytics
IV. Effects of mainstreamed judicial analytics on the justice system and
its stakeholders
1. The public
2. The judiciary
3. Lawyers
V. Responses to judicial analytics
1. Should judicial analytics tools be regulated?
2. How should judicial regulators respond to mainstreamed
judicial analytics?
Conclusion

Introduction
In 2019, the French government passed an unprecedented law that banned
the public from analyzing information in reported court decisions to draw
insights about the judicial behaviour of individual judges.1 The penalty
for breaking this law is steep: five years in prison.2 The law has broad
application, and it will limit the uses that academic researchers, legal
technology companies, law firms and members of the general public can
make of publicly available court information.
The French ban follows previous legal provisions enacted in 2016 to
make French case law more accessible to the public, as part of broader open
data and digital governance reforms.3 The resulting increased availability
1.
LOI n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018–2022 et de réforme pour la
justice (1), 24 March 2019, Article 33, online: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/article_jo/
JORFARTI000038261761?r=Xox7hUcdZ5> [https://perma.cc/4CFL-4GTQ]; as translated by
Rebecca Loescher, a professor of French at St. Edward’s University in France, and reported in Jason
Tashea “France bans publishing of judicial analytics and prompts criminal penalty” (7 June 2019),
online: ABA Journal <http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-creates-criminalpenalty-for-judicial-analytics> [https://perma.cc/34GU-Y7HW]: the law reads: “No personally
identifiable data concerning judges or court clerks may be subject to any reuse with the purpose or
result of evaluating, analyzing or predicting their actual or supposed professional practices.”
2.
Ibid.
3.
LOI n° 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016, JO, 8 October 2016, pour une République numérique,
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of public data made it relatively easy to model how individual judges
decide certain types of matters, potentially exposing them to comparison
with their fellow judges and criticism or allegations of bias.4 For example,
using a non-commercial analytics tool of his own creation, a French tax
lawyer published a report concluding that, based on the publicly available
data, “some judges had a very high asylum rejection ratio (close to 100 per
cent, with hundreds of cases per year) while others from the same court
had a very low ratio.”5 The 2019 ban purports to “turn off the data spigot
by banning the use of public information to ‘assess, analyze, compare
or predict’ how judges make decisions.”6 Officially, the ban was justified
on the basis that permitting judicial profiling could lead to undesirable
pressures on judicial decision-making and strategic behaviour by litigants.7
Critics have argued that the ban was motivated by the desire of judges to
avoid scrutiny and accountability.8
In our view, a French-style ban is not normatively defensible in
Canada given our constitutional protection of freedom of expression and
Article 21 (France).
4.
“France bans Judge Analytics, 5 Years in Prison for Rule Breakers” (4 June 2019), online:
Artificial Lawyer <https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/04/france-bans-judge-analytics-5years-in-prison-for-rule-breakers/> [perma.cc/VDZ2-GES7].
5.
Michaël Benesty, “The Judge Statistical Data Ban—My Story—Michaël Benesty” (7 June
2019), online: Artificial Lawyer <https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/07/the-judge-statisticaldata-ban-my-story-michael-benesty/> [https://perma.cc/3UWP-3RLR].
6.
Michael Livermore & Dan Rockmore, “France kicks data scientists out of its courts,” Slate (21
June 2019), online: <https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/france-has-banned-judicial-analytics-toanalyze-the-courts.html> [https://perma.cc/WEW9-VXR8].
7.
See, for example, France, Conseil Constitutionnel, Loi de programmation 2018–2022 et de
réforme pour la justice, Décision n° 2019-778 DC <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/rapportactivite-2019-numerique/dc-2019-778.php> [https://perma.cc/Y55G-T7XB], the report from
France’s Constitutional Council, stating at para. 93: “En prévoyant que les données d’identité des
magistrats et des membres du greffe figurant dans les décisions de justice mises à disposition du
public par voie électronique ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une réutilisation ayant pour objet ou pour effet
d’évaluer, d’analyser, de comparer ou de prédire leurs pratiques professionnelles réelles ou supposées,
le législateur a entendu éviter qu’une telle réutilisation permette, par des traitements de données
à caractère personnel, de réaliser un profilage des professionnels de justice à partir des décisions
rendues, pouvant conduire à des pressions ou des stratégies de choix de juridiction de nature à altérer
le fonctionnement de la justice,” which translates to: “By providing that personally identifiable
data concerning judges or court clerks appearing in court decisions made available to the public by
electronic means cannot be reused with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analyzing, comparing or
predicting their real or supposed professional practices, the legislator intended to prevent judicial
profiling which could lead to pressures on judges or strategies of choice of jurisdiction likely to alter
the functioning of justice.”
8.
See e.g. Simon Taylor, “French Data Analytics Law Won’t Stop Analytics” (7 June 2019),
online: LegalWeek <https://www.law.com/legal-week/2019/06/07/french-data-analytics-law-wontstop-analytics/> [https://perma.cc/5LEF-6ZX5]. For a less critical viewpoint, see Florence G’sell,
“Predicting courts’ decisions is lawful in France and will remain so” (24 June 2019), online: Blog de
Florence G’sell <https://gsell.tech/predicting-courts-decisions-is-lawful-in-france-and-will-remainso/> [https://perma.cc/6Z8H-MYYY].
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our strong open courts principle. The public should be able to analyze
information that is in the public domain. To give a stark example of what a
French-style ban would mean in Canada: a person could face prison time if
they produced a report that contained statistics comparing how often each
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada wrote a dissent in any given year.
We do believe, however, that Canada—like France—faces important
questions about how to respond to the fast-growing field of judicial
analytics. 9 Although studying judges is not new, judicial analytics tools
allow for much faster and more powerful analysis of large amounts of
information. Judicial analytics tools for public use already exist but, for
reasons we explain later in the article, such tools are likely to become
even more powerful and readily accessible in the near-to-medium future.
This will result in unprecedented public insight into judges and the work
of judging. We term this phenomenon “mainstreamed judicial analytics.”
It is this future world of mainstreamed judicial analytics that is the
focus of our article. What will happen in a world where technology allows
us to instantaneously draw up a detailed profile of a judge’s past behaviour
with a click of a smartphone button? What will happen when we have a
plethora of “stats” on how judges react to particular types of litigants,
lawyers, legal arguments or even individual words? What will happen
when we can pull up reports on how a judge’s behaviour may be impacted
by the day of the week, time of day or even the weather? Motivated by
these questions, this article provides an analysis of the future of judicial
analytics, its likely impacts, and potential responses to the rise of this
technology in Canada.
We conclude that the key potential benefit of mainstreamed judicial
analytics is significantly increased transparency into the work of judging.
Such transparency could provide an opportunity for the public to better
critique and more effectively operate within the justice system. Also, judges
could use information produced by judicial analytics tools to reflect on and
improve upon their practices, where needed. Meaningful transparency,
however, is not a guaranteed output. Some practical complications to
producing high-quality information will remain even with “mainstreamed”
tools. We also identify potential risks resulting from increased surveillance
of judges, including the potential for unwanted strategic behaviour and
negative impacts on judges’ health and well-being. Finally, we note that

9.
Our focus is on “judicial analytics” given that existing tools and commentary tend to focus
on analyzing patterns in judicial decision-making. We acknowledge, however, that most, if not all,
of our arguments would apply to analytics of other adjudicative processes, including administrative
tribunals.
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lawyers and judges will need to become familiar with this technology in
order to competently perform their jobs.
This article is organized in five parts. In Part I, we describe the
technology at the heart of judicial analytics and identify the types of
information that analytics tools can reveal about judges and judging.
In Parts II and III, we acknowledge some limitations of current legal
analytics tools, and explain why it is likely that judicial analytics tools
will become more powerful and widely available—“mainstreamed”—in
the near-to-medium future. In Part IV, we consider the possible effects of
mainstreamed judicial analytics tools for three justice system stakeholder
groups: the public, the judiciary and the legal profession. In Part V, we
look to responses to judicial analytics, highlighting voluntary third-party
certification and the production of credible public tools as possible means
of mitigating some of the risks inherent in judicial analytics. We also call
on judicial regulators to consider how information made available through
mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may influence their work.
I. What is judicial analytics?
Broadly speaking, analytics is the process “of discovering and
communicating the meaningful patterns which can be found in data.”10
There are different categories of analytics: (1) descriptive analytics,
which focus on “gathering, organizing, tabulating and depicting data”;
(2) predictive analytics, where data is used to “predict future courses of
action”; and (3) prescriptive analytics, which offers “recommendations on
future courses of action.”11
Excitement about analytics is closely tied to the emergence of “big
data.” Big data refers not only to the vast amount of data available in a
digitalized world, but also the technical capacity to do meaningful things
with this data:
[W]hat makes Big data a new and interesting phenomenon in the world…
is not its volume alone, but the fact that we are able to “mine” large
data sets using new and advanced techniques to uncover unexpected
relationships, patterns and categories within these data sets…12

10. “Definition—What does Analytics mean?” (last modified 20 February 2017), online: Techopedia
<https://www.techopedia.com/definition/30296/analytics> [https://perma.cc/Q6JQ-89TP].
11. Thomas H Davenport & Jinho Kim, Keeping up with the Quants: Your Guide to Understanding
and Using Analytics (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2013) at 3.
12. Bennett B Borden & Jason R Baron, “Finding the Signal in the Noise: Information Governance,
Analytics, and the Future of Legal Practice” (2014) 20 Richmond JL & Technology 7 at 16.

254 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The availability of techniques like machine learning13 and natural
language processing14 have allowed for the development of more powerful
analytics tools. These techniques have made it possible to quickly find
patterns in, and predict outcomes from, large amounts of data in ways that
are simply not possible with the human mind alone or by using simpler
technologies.
Analytics is now used in many different industries and fields. For
example, the film Moneyball, and the book upon which it is based, address
the use of analytics in baseball.15 As digitized court data has become
increasingly available to the public, the application of analytics tools to
legal data—legal analytics—has grown apace. Legal analytics generally
involves,
…mining data contained in case documents and docket entries, and then
aggregating that data to provide previously unknowable insights into the
behavior of the individuals (judges and lawyers), organizations (parties,
courts, law firms), and the subjects of lawsuits (such as patents) that
populate the litigation ecosystem.16

The commercial potential of legal analytics tools has led long-time legal
research providers like LexisNexis and Westlaw to acquire and develop
their own products,17 while start-ups like Loom Analytics and Blue J Legal
compete in the emerging Canadian legal analytics market.18 The United
States boasts significantly more legal analytics tools than Canada,19 and, as
13. Law Society of Ontario, Technology Taskforce Update Report (November 29, 2019), online:
<https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/about/convocation/2019/convocationnovember-2019-technologytaskforce-report.pdf>: “Machine Learning” refers to when a tool “uses
algorithms to parse data, learn from it, and then make a determination or a prediction based on it.” at 8.
14. Ibid: “Natural language processing” involves “deriv[ing] useful meaning from written and
spoken language by drawing connections between words and phrases.” at 8.
15. Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: WW Norton &
Company, 2004).
16. Owen Byrd, “Legal Analytics vs Legal Research: What’s the Difference?” (12 June 2015),
online: Law Technology Today, <https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2017/06/legal-analytics-vslegal-research/> [https://perma.cc/2KUG-66DQ].
17. See e.g. Robert Ambrogi, “LexisNexis Launches Lexis Analytics, Putting a ‘Stake in the
Ground’ to Claim the Legal Analytics Space” (13 July 2018), online: Law Sites <https://www.
lawsitesblog.com/2018/07/lexisnexis-launches-lexis-analytics-putting-stake-ground-claim-legalanalytics-space.html> [https://perma.cc/MW87-P2R5]; Robert Ambrogi, “Move Over Westlaw: Meet
the Next-Generation Westlaw Edge, with Advanced AI and Analytics” (12 July 2018), online: Law
Sites <https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/07/move-westlaw-meet-next-generation-westlaw-edgeadvanced-ai-analytics.html> [https://perma.cc/EF6C-AD36].
18. Loom Analytics, online: <https://www.loomanalytics.com> [https://perma.cc/TVD4-2CVE];
Blue J Legal, online: <https://www.bluejlegal.com/ca> [https://perma.cc/Y8S5-QEDC].
19. Examples of tools available in the American market include: Lexis Analytics, online: <https://
www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-analytics.page> [https://perma.cc/64T5-4J73]; Westlaw
Edge, online: <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/announcing-westlaw-edge>
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the French ban suggests, the market in legal analytics is growing quickly
in Europe, too.20
Judicial analytics—also referred to as judge analytics or court
analytics—is a sub-category of legal analytics. Tools that are marketed
under this title involve the specific application of analytics technologies
to judges and judicial decision-making. One of the outcomes of judicial
analytics is “judge profiling,” which involves “the monitoring and
prediction of the behavior of judges.”21 Providers of judicial analytics
tools promote the ability of their tools to provide users with information
on topics including:
• the language, precedents and other judges that a particular judge
finds the most compelling;22
• the “specific logic” that a judge tends to use when granting or
denying a particular type of motion;23
• how likely a user’s case is to prevail before a particular judge;24
• how long a particular judge takes to decide a certain type of
motion;25
• how a particular judge tends to rule on a particular type of case, like
a summary judgment motion;26
• how often a judge is affirmed or reversed (in whole or in part) on
appeal;27 and
• “outcome analysis by gender and race.”28

[https://perma.cc/HM7K-H6XU]; Bloomberg Law, online: <https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/aianalytics/> [https://perma.cc/3SKY-AWUM]; Gavelytics, online: <https://www.gavelytics.com/>
[https://perma.cc/V2YL-EKN2]; and Premonition Analytics LLC, online: <https://premonition.ai/
about-us/> [https://perma.cc/66XF-FZT4].
20. Bart Jan van Ettekoven & Corien Prins, “Data Analysis, Artificial Intelligence and the Judiciary
System” in Vanessa Mak, Eric Tjong Tjin Tai & Anna Berlee, eds, Research Handbook in Data
Science and Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2018) 425 at 426 (note that European legal analytics
tools include, e.g. lexiq.nl; legalloyd.com, kenedict.com/rodeo).
21. Ibid at 427.
22. “Context Judge Analytics” online: LexisNexis <https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/
context.page> [https://perma.cc/ADG8-7FNM].
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. “Westlaw Edge: Litigation Analytics” online: Westlaw <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/
products/westlaw/edge/litigation-analytics> [https://perma.cc/2VS9-LZCD].
26. Ibid.
27. See e.g. Bloomberg Law, online: <https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/> [https://perma.cc/3AM54WPC].
28. See e.g. “Premonition Judicial Dashboard” online (pdf): Premonition <https://premonition.ai/
wp-content/plugins/wonderplugin-pdf-embed/pdfjs/web/viewer.html?disabledownload=1&file=ht
tps%3A%2F%2Fpremonition.ai%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2018%2F01%2FPA036-JudicialDashboard-Sales-Sheet3.pdf/> [https://perma.cc/5RAM-AQWZ].
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Most judicial analytics tools also offer a comparative function, where
statistics on an individual judge can be compared against other judges or
a court average.29
Not all judicial analytics tools are commercial products geared toward
lawyers and law firms. Academic researchers have also built judicial
analytics tools to conduct their own empirical analyses of judicial decisionmaking.30 In general, the judicial analytics tools used in academic settings
are tailor-made for specific research projects and generate narrow, albeit
interesting and important, results.31 These non-commercial tools are not
widely available for public use.
Reporting on patterns in judicial decision-making is not new.
Academics have been doing this for decades without the benefit of analytics
technology.32 Judicial analytics tools, however, can radically decrease the
resources required for such analyses and may yield insights that would
be inaccessible using human cognition or traditional technologies. The
difference that technological intervention can make in empirical studies of
judges is evident in a comparison of Sean Rehaag’s two studies of refugee

29. See e.g. Bloomberg Law, “Comparative Analytics tool” online: Bloomberg Law <https://
help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-030-litigation-intelligence-center.html> [https://perma.cc/PX9H9GZE].
30. See e.g. Wolfgang Alschner, “The Computational Analysis of International Law” in Rossana
Deplano & Nicholas Tsagourias, eds, Research Methods in International Law: A Handbook
(forthcoming), available online at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428762>
[https://perma.cc/Y9UG-GFFU]; Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations (II):
Revisiting the Luck of the Draw” Queen’s LJ (forthcoming), available online at: <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249723> [https://perma.cc/3H7S-L5BC] [Rehaag, “Revisiting
Refugee Determinations”]; Nikolaos Aletras et al, “Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective” (2016) 2 Peer J Comp Sci 92;
although see also critique of the Aletras et al study in Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, “Prediction,
Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 63. In addition to the use of
analytics tools to look at case law, there is a growing field of “legal text mining” where analytical tools
are applied to other legal documents; see e.g. Wolfgang Alschner et al, “Text of Trade Agreements
(ToTA)—A Structured Corpus for the Text‐As‐Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements”
(2018) 15:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 648.
31. For example, for his first study of decision-making in the refugee law context in Canada’s
Federal Court, Sean Rehaag, supra note 30, wrote his own computer program and, for his second
study, he revised code developed by another academic to study factors that influence outcomes in
immigration law judicial reviews in a different jurisdiction.
32. Examples of Canadian studies that do not rely on judicial analytics technology include e.g.
Vanessa MacDonnell, “Justice Suzanne Côté’s Reputation as a Dissenter on the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d) 47; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew James Green, “The Reasonable Justice:
An Empirical Analysis of Justice Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007)
57 UTLJ 195; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew James Green, “Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Voting”
(19 December 2017), draft available on SSRN: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3090789> [https://perma.cc/3X6X-BXZP]; and Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria & Emily Lawrence,
“What’s Law Good For?: An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24
SCLR (2d) 103.
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law decision-making at Canada’s Federal Court.33 In Rehaag’s first study, in
2012, he conducted a quantitative empirical assessment of 23,000 Federal
Court applications for leave to review refugee determinations.34 The 2012
study provided important insight into judicial decision-making in this
context, concluding that “these applications often hinged on which judge
was assigned to decide whether to grant leave, with the leave grant rates
of individual judges ranging from 1% to 77%.”35 Reaching this conclusion
took hundreds of hours of time and human labour.36 Although a computer
program was used to collect data from online dockets, the research team
manually reviewed and coded the data.37
Rehaag’s second study in 2018 provided an updated empirical analysis,
with a view to looking at more recent data and assessing the impact of
new measures adopted by the Federal Court to address variations in leave
grant rates among judges.38 For the 2018 study, Rehaag adopted a different
methodological approach, revising computer code developed by another
academic to automate the manual review and code the data. This different
methodology dramatically reduced the human labour required for the
study.39 By using this advanced technology, Rehaag was able to conduct a
comparable study with significantly fewer resources and in less time. As
this example demonstrates, what is novel about judicial analytics is not so
much what it can do; instead the novelty lies in the speed and ease with
which judicial analytics tools can sift through huge data sets to extract
pertinent information and insights.
The capacity of legal analytics tools to quickly generate new insights
has led to significant excitement in the legal industry. For example,
legal analytics tools have been branded “moneyball for lawyers” and
characterized as having the potential to “disrupt” norms in legal practice.40
In addition to the hype, there is evidence that lawyers are using these tools
33. Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1
Queen’s LJ 1 [Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations]; and Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,”
supra note 30.
34. Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30 at 2, summarizing the 2012 study
from Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations,” supra note 33.
35. Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30.
36. Ibid at 6.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at 2.
39. Ibid at 6.
40. For blog and media takes, see e.g. Anne Tucker & Charlotte Alexander, “Why we’re training
the next generation of lawyers in big data” (2 October 2018), online: The Conversation <http://
theconversation.com/why-were-training-the-next-generation-of-lawyers-in-big-data-103196>
[https://perma.cc/FB5P-X2L4]; Barney Thomson, “Big Data: Legal Firms play ‘Moneyball’”
(6 February 2019), online: Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/ca351ff6-1a4e-11e9-9e64d150b3105d21> [https://perma.cc/8EMD-8ELM].
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in their practices.41 A 2020 Legal Analytics Study, conducted by ALM
Intelligence in collaboration with LexisNexis, surveyed 163 large law firm
professionals and reported that 70 per cent of law firms surveyed were
using legal analytics.42 While determining the exact size of the market for
legal analytics tools—including the sub-set of judicial analytics tools—is
difficult, it is clear that this is not a fringe technology but rather it is one
with rapidly growing use, at least among certain segments of the legal
profession.
II. The limits of current legal analytics tools
Notwithstanding the excitement and increased use of legal analytics, it is
important to address the limits of existing analytics tools.
First, there are limits in what is covered in the available data set. Not all
judicial behaviour is recorded and not all court records are made available in
digital format, such that they can be readily inputted into judicial analytics
tools. Many court decisions are not publicly reported, either because a
judge issues oral reasons, gives no reasons at all, or the written reasons
are not provided to a public or commercial database. Likewise, not all
proceedings are transcribed and even where proceedings are transcribed,
it can be very difficult and costly to access transcripts.43 Finally, court
files—which contain materials such as the parties’ pleadings and written
evidence in affidavit form and which might be combined with other sources
of information to indirectly gain insights into judicial decision-making44—
are generally accessible only in hard copy, by attending a court house.45
The incomplete nature of the data sets available to judicial analytics tools
narrows the insights that such tools are able to produce.

41. See generally Josh Becker, “Legal Analytics and the Evolving Practice of Law” (25 June 2020),
online: Law.com <https://www.law.com/2020/06/25/legal-analytics-and-the-evolving-practice-oflaw/>.
42. LexisNexis, 2020 Legal Analytics Study: Bringing Value into Focus (LexisNexis, 2020).
43. For an excellent overview of the difficulty and costs associated with obtaining court transcripts
in Canada, see Kaila Scarrow, Becky Robinet & Julie Macfarlane, Is Access to Court Transcripts in
Canada an A2J Issue?: Report prepared for the National Self-Represented Litigants Project (June
2018), online: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=lawpub>
[https://perma.cc/Y6E6-Y8RG].
44. For example, written arguments on an appeal could be combined with information from the
ultimate decision and transcripts of the oral arguments to better understand what types of arguments or
case law a judge tends to find persuasive.
45. For further discussion, see Jacquelyn Burkell & Jane Bailey, “Revisiting the Open Court
Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and
Witnesses’ Personal Information” (2017) 48:1 Ottawa L Rev 147. Although these types of documents
are not a direct record of judicial behaviour, in the same way that a court decision or a transcript of
court proceeding would be, they can be combined with other sources of information to indirectly gain
insights.
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Second, data quality can affect the work of analytics. For example, even
if a case is reported, it may contain a typo or misspelling which results in it
being improperly included or excluded from a data set. Inconsistencies can
also generate problems. For example, a judge’s name may be written in a
variety of different formats, even in related decisions from the same court
that are published within a short time frame.46 These types of issues within
a data set can affect the quality of the insights generated by an analytics
tool relying on that set. In the American context, the uneven quality of
the data contained in the electronic public access service for federal court
documents, PACER,47 has been identified as one of the most significant
problems facing the legal analytics market.48
A third limitation arises from the fact that certain areas of law—where
comparable matters are decided on a high-volume basis—may be more
susceptible to statistical analysis than others. As Benjamin Alarie, Anthony
Niblett and Albert H Yoon have observed, not all legal questions are well
suited to the application of artificial intelligence:
The temptation of artificial intelligence is to view it as a proverbial
hammer where all the legal questions are nails. The law does not fit this
paradigm. It is inappropriate in instances where the court’s determination
of a legal question does not lend itself to an identifiable set of factors, or
where insufficient data exist. Future developments may well be able to
surmount these current challenges of limited data and inchoate context;
time will tell.49

In other words, it will generally be easier to track trends in judicial
decision-making across discrete and narrow decisions that are made in
large numbers by courts—like granting bail or decisions to allow judicial
review of refugee determinations—than to draw out statistically relevant
46. This example is taken from an August 2019 tweet by legal research executive Colin LaChance,
“Fun with legal data. Reviewing judgments with a view to normalizing judge name as data field and
come across 3 related decisions of same judge, same court, same parties, all within a few months of
each other—but judge’s name written 3 different ways. If only this were unusual.” (31 August 2019),
online: Twitter (original tweet no longer available because author changed accounts but on file with
authors, who have also obtained permission to refer to the tweet in this article).
47. PACER is the acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. It is managed by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and contains case and docket information from the
United States district, appellate and bankruptcy courts. See PACER online: <https://www.pacer.gov/>
[https://perma.cc/MV53-DD8L].
48. Jean O’Grady, “What Do Law Firms Need to Know About Purchasing Litigation Analytics
Products?” (26 July 2019), online: Above the Law <https://abovethelaw.com/2019/07/what-do-lawfirms-need-to-know-about-purchasing-litigation-analytics-products/> [https://perma.cc/M4US69FS].
49. Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H Yoon, “How Artificial Intelligence will Affect the
Practice of Law” (9 November 2017), online: TSpace Research Repository <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3066816> [https://perma.cc/7X77-SXAZ] at 10.
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patterns within more amorphous categories of cases, like for example,
comparing cases within the broad basket of “commercial disputes.”
A fourth limitation relates to the capacity of analytics tools to read and
analyze case law. Major challenges arise because case law is often highly
“unstructured.”50 Judges do not follow a template or standard format in
crafting their decisions.51 As a result, a reported legal decision does not
neatly organize the relevant information into pre-set fields, unlike, for
example, a well-designed electronic medical record.52 “While opinions
follow a general form – recitation of facts, discussion of relevant case
law, and application of law to the facts…,” a computer cannot simply look
for a field in a legal decision titled “ratio” and extract this information
for use in a data set.53 Compounding these challenges is the fact that each
judge writes in their own “voice,” relying on unique language preferences
and habits.54 Even gathering all cases on a single topic is not necessarily
straightforward. An account of the founding of Lex Machina, a prominent
American legal analytics company that was acquired by LexisNexis in
2015, noted that, in preparing its original statistical database of intellectual
property litigation decisions, “locating all cases related to patent
infringement was complicated by the fact that the exact term didn’t always
appear in a document’s text.”55 The net effect of these issues is that judicial
analytics tools often rely heavily on humans to manually extract relevant
data from the cases and/or to review initial computer-generated results.56
In the case of Lex Machina, “it took the team about 100 000 hours” to
“manually sort through, categorize, and correct the data” to develop its
statistical database.57 This human labour translates into significant frontend costs when developing judicial analytics tools.58
50. For a detailed overview of the lack of standardization in Canadian legal decisions, see
Jon Khan “The Life of a Reserve: How Might We Improve the Structure, Content, Accessibility,
Length & Timeliness of Judicial Decisions?” (Master of Laws (LL.M) thesis, University of
Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2019) [unpublished]), available online: <https://tspace.library.utoronto.
ca/bitstream/1807/98120/1/Khan_Jon_%20_201911_LLM_thesis.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/VEM2MSRR]).
51. Supra note 49 at 11.
52. This helpful comparison was taken from Khan, supra note 50 at 88.
53. The first part of this sentence is taken from Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, supra note 49.
54. Ibid at 10.
55. Tam Harbert, “The Law Machine,” IEEE Spectrum 50:11 (2013) 31 at 34. For details about the
acquisition, see Lex Machina, “LexisNexis Acquires Premier Legal Analytics Provider Lex Machina”
Lex Machina (23 November 2015), online: < https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lexisnexis-acquireslex-machina/>.
56. See e.g. the discussion in Kevin Ashley, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 4 and Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, supra note 49 at 10-11.
57. Tam Harbert, “The Law Machine,” IEEE Spectrum 50:11 (2013) 31 at 34.
58. Supra note 49 at 11.
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A fifth limitation stems from the fact that judicial analytics tools are
expensive to create: these costs are passed along to users, so not everyone
can afford to access judicial analytics tools. Commercial tools charge
user fees. Pricing for commercial legal analytics platforms is not readily
accessible but extrapolating from what we know about commercial legal
research tools, the costs likely run at several hundreds of dollars a month,
at minimum, for individual users.59 While in some cases, access may be
provided to academic institutions at no-cost or low-cost, free or subsidized
access is not generally available.60 The costs associated with commercial
tools are prohibitive for many, if not most, members of the general public.
III. The rise of mainstreamed judicial analytics
There are several reasons why judicial analytics tools are likely to improve
significantly in the near-to-medium terms. The above limitations are not
permanent, at least not in their current forms.
First, the available datasets are likely to increase in size and scope.
Although courts have been notoriously slow to digitize their records,
including judicial decisions, an increasing amount of past court material
is being converted into digital format.61 An example of the scale at which
digitization of court decisions is taking place is Harvard’s Case Law Access
Project which “digitized over 40 million pages of U.S. court decisions…
transforming them into a dataset of over 6.7 million cases that represent
360 years of U.S. legal history.”62 Additionally, biographical information
about judges is increasingly available and may be used by judicial analytics
tools in combination with court records to develop judicial profiles.63
In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the
digitization of court records and court processes. As the Attorney General
of Ontario noted, “COVID was the catalyst that allowed us to move
forward [on court modernizations] 25 years in 25 days.”64 Additionally,
59. Bob Ambrogi, “Price Wars in Legal Research Mean Deals for Small Firms; I Compare Costs”
LawSites (23 May 2019), online: Law Sites <https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/05/price-wars-inlegal-research-mean-deals-for-small-firms-i-compare-costs.html> [https://perma.cc/3J2N-LRUF].
60. For example, Lex Machina states that it provides free access to “certain university and college
faculty staff and students, directly engaged in research, or study of law and policy” for “public interest
purposes,” online: <https://lexmachina.com/public-interest/> [https://perma.cc/DKT6-T73Q].
61. For a description of this trend, see e.g. Burkell & Bailey, supra note 45.
62. Project: Caselaw Access Project, online: <https://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-accessproject/> [https://perma.cc/4BMS-9SQZ].
63. For example, the Free Law Project, an American non-profit, has launched a Judge and Appointer
Database that “includes biographical data about each person, the roles they have held before, during
and after their time in the judicial branch, their political affiliations, their education, and any retention
events that kept them in a judicial position (such as a reappointment),” online: <https://free.law/
judicial-database/> [https://perma.cc/K7M5-U547].
64. John Lancaster, “How COVID-19 helped push Ontario’s low-tech justice system into the 21st
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to the extent that the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated an increase
in virtual hearings in the immediate and longer terms, it may be easier
for judicial analytics tools to include oral decision-making and in-court
behaviour (for example, the nature or frequency of questions from the
bench) by judges into their datasets.65 If the recordings of virtual hearings
are publicly accessible, it may eventually be possible to use automated
transcription technologies to easily produce digital transcriptions of
proceedings that can then be analyzed by judicial analytics tools.66
Second, the technology is likely to continue to improve. Current
functional limitations related to the ability of judicial analytics tools
to “read” information in the data set are unlikely to be permanent. The
available technology, while struggling with predictive tasks like modeling
legal reasoning, is already good at one of the main functions behind
judicial analytics: pattern recognition.67 The challenges of creating a tool
that can easily “read” court decisions are complex but there have been
significant technical advances in this area and experts seem confident that
there are more to come. As Kevin Ashley observes in his book, Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Analytics, there are several new techniques for
analyzing text that hold promise for automatically, rather than manually,
extracting information from legal texts.68 At the same time, there is growing
discussion about publishing judicial decisions in open, machine-readable
format and, thus, addressing at least some of the readability issues at their
source.69
century,” CBC News (4 June 2020), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/covid-19technology-courts-ontario-1.5596643> [https://perma.cc/B59R-V5KV].
65. For discussion about the increased use of virtual court hearings in Canada as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic, see e.g. “COVID-19 and the courts: May 11 update” (11 May 2020), online:
Canadian Lawyer Mag <https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/litigation/covid-19and-the-courts-may-11-update/329500> [https://perma.cc/6XTT-NNZU]; Sean Fine, “Supreme Court
of Canada to hold virtual hearings in June” (7 May 2020), online: The Globe and Mail <https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-supreme-court-of-canada-to-hold-virtual-hearings-in-june/>
[https://perma.cc/U9AT-VVEP]; and Daniel Urbas, “Canadian Courts Employ Virtual Hearings”
(15 April 2020), online: American Bar <https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/
alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2020/canadian-courts-employ-vrtual-hearings/>
[https://
perma.cc/P95C-JL5W].
66. For discussion on the emergence and capacity of automated transcription tools, see e.g.
John Markoff, “From Your Mouth to Your Screen, Transcribing Takes the Next Step” (2 October
2019), online: The New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/technology/automatic-speechtranscription-ai.html> [https://perma.cc/6C7V-KGMV]; and Greg Noone, “When AI Can Transcribe
Everything” (20 June 2017), online: The Atlantic <www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/
automated-transcription/530973/> [https://perma.cc/8XKV-Q9DE].
67. Kenneth A. Grady, “What is the Potential of AI in the Legal Sector?” in The 2019 Aderant
Business of Law and Legal Technology Survey at 23, online: <https://www.aderant.com/research/2019business-of-law-legal-technology-survey/> [https://perma.cc/7934-QPJC].
68. Supra note 56 at 4-5.
69. See e.g. Dr. Natalie Byrom, “Digital Justice: HMCTS data strategy and delivering access to
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Third, as judicial analytics tools have access to more data and become
more powerful from a technical standpoint, they will also likely become
more accessible. The primary accessibility barrier is cost. However, as
digital court records become universally available and directly readable
by machines, the front-end costs of developing judicial analytics tools
should decrease significantly.70 As the costs come down, tools that were
previously the domain of “high-end” segments of the legal industry and
pockets of the academy will become more easily accessible to the public.71
These three probable developments, taken together, are the basis for
our prediction that judicial analytics will become mainstreamed. It is
this future world of “mainstreamed judicial analytics” that informs the
remainder of our analysis.
IV. Effects of mainstreamed judicial analytics on the justice system and
its stakeholders
What does the world of mainstreamed judicial analytics look like? This
section focuses on this question, from three perspectives: that of the
public, judges, and lawyers.
1. The public
If and when judicial analytics tools become more powerful and easily
accessible to the public, broad public consequences are likely to follow.
In this section, we consider the possibility that mainstreamed judicial
analytics tools will result in increased transparency about the work of
judging. We explore not only the benefits of such transparency but also
the practical barriers to achieving meaningful transparency using tools of
this type.
Canada prides itself on having court processes and outcomes that
are open to the public. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly
stated that “[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice”72 and that open courts
justice: Report and Recommendations” (October 2019) at 29, online: (pdf) The Legal Education
Foundation
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/835778/DigitalJusticeFINAL.PDF> [https://perma.cc/RZ2B-XJYK].
70. This prediction, of course, depends on whether court records, once digitized, are also easily
accessible in the “bulk” format needed for use in judicial analytics tools. For further discussion of this
issue, see Addison Cameron-Huff, “Why Google Can’t Build A Case Law Search Engine in Ontario”
(11 February 2014), online: Cameronhuff.com <https://www.cameronhuff.com/blog/ontario-case-lawprivate/> [https://perma.cc/G3AF-TDBN].
71. Here, we might consider, Peter Diamandis’ “6Ds” framework of the growth cycle of exponential
technology, explained, e.g. in Vanessa Bates Ramirez, “The 6 Ds of Tech Disruption: A Guide to
the Digital Economy” (22 November 2016), online: Singularity Hub < https://singularityhub.
com/2016/11/22/the-6-ds-of-tech-disruption-a-guide-to-the-digital-economy/>
[https://perma.cc/
L4GB-LQYB].
72. Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, [1982] 1 SCR 175, 132 DLR (3d) 385 at 183,
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are “a hallmark of a democratic society.”73 In many important respects, the
current openness of our courts generates meaningful transparency about our
justice system: the public is generally permitted to attend court proceedings
and a significant number of judicial decisions are reported and made
easily available to the public. This openness, however, has not resulted in
widespread, sophisticated understandings about how judges decide cases or
act in courtrooms. The public has far greater access to statistics about the
performance of professional athletes in a given season than about judges and
their decisions. By providing the public with increased access to detailed
information about judging, mainstreamed judicial analytics tools have the
potential to provide increased insight into what judges do and how they do
it. Armed with more information, the public can more effectively participate
in, and critique, what is happening in the justice system.
How might mainstreamed judicial analytics tools facilitate public
participation in the judicial system? Analytics companies already
frequently claim that litigants can achieve better results when they know
more about the particular judge adjudicating their case.74 For example, if
a judicial analytics tool can highlight trends in the case law, arguments
or language that a judge tends to prefer, then a litigant or their lawyer
can tailor their submissions accordingly. Similarly, if a judicial analytics
tool can highlight patterns in the types of questions that are asked by a
particular judge, then the litigant or their lawyer can better prepare to
argue their case in court.
Litigants may also use the information provided by judicial analytics
tools to try to have a matter heard or not heard by a particular judge. It is
possible that “judge shopping”—that is, attempting to have a case heard or
not heard by a particular judge because of that judge’s record or reputation
—may increase, where possible, if judicial analytics tools are more widely
available. To date, our legal system has discouraged judge shopping on
the basis of “concerns for the impartiality of the administration of justice,
real and perceived.”75 But our legal system is also committed to the
citing Jeremy Bentham, “Draught of a New Plan for the organisation of the Judicial Establishment in
France: proposed as a Succedaneum to the Draught presented, for the same purpose, by the Committee
of Constitution, to the National Assembly, December 21st, 1789” printed in London, 1790, 25-6
(Bowring, iv. 285-406, at 316-317).
73. Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 at para 23.
74. For example, the American judicial analytics company, Gavelytics, supra note 19, promises that
its AI-generated reports on individual judges, which include information on a judge’s background,
typical workload, and whether a judge rules more often for plaintiffs or defendants (called a
“Gavelscore”), will help lawyers “win more business, position your case, and better manage client
expectations.”
75. R v Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para 60; R v Scott, [1990] 3 SCR 979 116 NR 361 at pp 1008-1009.
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principle of equality before and under the law.76 A fundamental feature
of equality requires judges to avoid relying on bias, stereotypes or other
discriminatory beliefs in reaching their decisions.77 If a judicial analytics
tool demonstrates that Judge A takes disproportionately punitive measures
against members of a particular group, while controlling for other factors
such as the merits of the case, how can a litigant who belongs to that group
be criticized for trying to avoid having Judge A hear their case?
In addition to increased “judge shopping,” mainstreamed judicial
analytics tools may also result in a surge in applications to have judges
disqualified for a reasonable apprehension of bias. On such applications,
courts are directed to apply “a strong presumption of judicial impartiality,”
which has historically resulted in “a heavy burden on a party who seeks
to rebut this presumption.”78 Judicial analytics tools have the potential to
ease this burden. Notwithstanding the presumption of impartiality, the
relevant test does not focus on actual proof of bias but rather on reasonable
perceptions.79 What happens, then, when litigant B and their lawyer enter
a courtroom armed with statistical reports from judicial analytics tools
showing that the judge presiding over the case has a verifiable record of
disproportionately disfavouring litigants similar to litigant B? Although,
as Sean Rehaag has observed, “[c]ourts have regularly held that statistical
differences in outcomes are not sufficient on their own to ground a finding
of reasonable apprehension of bias,” we also agree with his conclusion
that “there are…exceptional circumstances where statistical evidence
is so overwhelming that it meets the test for a reasonable apprehension
of bias.”80 Moreover, the amount and nature of evidence that may be
76. Equality is embodied, inter alia, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Freedoms,
s 15, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982,
c 11, which guarantees: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability” [Charter].
77. The ethical guidance for federally appointed judges posits: “Equality according to law is
fundamental to justice and is strongly linked to judicial impartiality. Judges cannot reach correct
results if they engage in stereotyping. Acting in this way compromises impartiality, real or perceived.”
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council), online
(pdf):
<https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/PH96-TFTE].
78. Carby-Samuels II v Carby-Samuels, 2018 ONCA 664 at para 4.
79. See e.g. Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General),
2015 SCC 25 at paras 20-25. In Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 66, the
Supreme Court confirmed “the relevant inquiry is not whether there was in fact either conscious or
unconscious bias on the part of the judge, but whether a reasonable person properly informed would
apprehend that there was.”
80. Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations,” supra note 33 at 34, Law Depot <https://www.lawdepot.
ca/> [https://perma.cc/47LU-C3AN]..

266 The Dalhousie Law Journal

possible to marshal via mainstreamed judicial analytics tools is likely to
fundamentally impact how reasonable apprehension of bias applications
are approached and decided.
At a systemic level, mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may change
the kind and quantity of critiques of judges and the justice system. Both
the impartiality and competence of judges are potential targets.
In general terms, judicial impartiality “refers to a state of mind or
attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular
case” and “connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived.”81 It is understood
to be an essential feature of the proper functioning of our justice system
and a core ethical obligation of judges.82 Judicial impartiality—both what it
means and whether it can be or should be achieved—has been the subject of
serious questions and critiques. Courts have grappled with articulating the
relationship between judicial impartiality and neutrality.83 Legal scholars
have canvassed the “unending difficulties in applying the theoretical
demands for impartiality and disengagement” required of judges and have
offered compelling critiques of the desirability of impartiality as a judicial
ideal.84 Yet judicial impartiality, at least as an aspirational ideal, operates
both rhetorically and doctrinally as a necessary condition for the proper
functioning of our justice system. To provide two concrete examples:
(1) the principle of judicial impartiality is constitutionally mandated in
the criminal context; and (2) it is included as a requirement of procedural
fairness in administrative contexts.85
81. Valente v R, [1985] 2 SCR 673 at 685 24 DLR (4th) 161.
82. According to former Chief Justice McLachlin, “[j]udges must maintain the appearance and
reality of impartiality. It is impartiality that distinguishes us from the other branches of government,
and impartiality that gives us our legitimacy.” The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, The Role of
Judges in Modern Society, Remarks at the Fourth Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference (5
May 2001), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2001-05-05-eng.aspx> [https://
perma.cc/PKR4-7GQ7]; the ethical guidelines for federally appointed judges in Canada, supra note
77, state, for example, that “judges must be and appear to be impartial in their performance of judicial
duties.”
83. See e.g. R v S(RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at paras 34-35 151 DLR (4th) 193.
84. Judith Resnik, “On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges”
(1988) 61:6 S Cal L Rev 1877 at 1879. Feminist scholars have called attention to the fact that because
“the masculine in law has been universalized and appears under the guise of impartiality and neutrality
means that women’s perspectives are understood not as equally universal, but as particular, biased,
special interests, not providing the degree of objectivity required for authoritative judgement”:
Rosemary Hunter, “Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism” in
Vanessa E Munro, The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Taylor & Francis,
2016) 13 at 15; see also Jeffrey M Shaman, “The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?” (1995–
1996) 45 DePaul L Rev 605.
85. The principle of judicial impartiality is embodied inter alia, in the Charter, supra note 76 at
s. 11(d), which provides that any person charged with a criminal offence has the right to “a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” For an administrative law example, see e.g.
Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58.
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What happens, then, if judicial analytics tools make ubiquitous
information that calls judicial impartiality into question? What if a judicial
analytics tool demonstrates statistically significant disparities in the way
that Judge C—or indeed, judges throughout the justice system—grants bail
to a racialized accused person or sentences a racialized person convicted
of a certain crime, compared to white persons who are similarly situated?
To be sure, such revelations will not be fundamentally new. Academic
studies have demonstrated the effects on judicial decision-making of
factors like race86 and gender.87 Members of racialized and other equity
seeking groups know from years of lived experience that the legal system
cannot be relied upon for fair and equal treatment.88 What will be new, in
a world of mainstreamed judicial analytics, is that statistical information
about judging and the differences in decision-making trends between
judges will be widely and easily available to anyone, anywhere.
It is also possible that judicial analytics tools will provide meaningful
information about extra-legal factors that influence a particular judge’s
decision-making. Studies have tracked the influence of factors including
the weather, when a judge had their last snack break or even football game
outcomes on judicial decision-making.89 If judicial analytics tools routinely
86. There are numerous empirical studies from various jurisdictions that confirm that racialized
persons experience worse outcomes at virtually every moment of the criminal justice process when
compared to non-racialized offenders: see e.g. David Lammy, The Lammy Review: An independent
review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the
Criminal Justice System (United Kingdom, 2017), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/QZT4-YZSP]; United States Sentencing Commission, Demographic Differences
in Sentencing: An Update to the 2012 Booker Report (Washington: United States Sentencing
Commission, 2017), online: <https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf> [https://perma.cc/E2PM-4CAH]; Report
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Government of Manitoba, 1991), online: <http://www.
ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html> [https://perma.cc/47XQ-EBRZ]; Katy M Colon, Philip R Kavanaugh,
Don Hummer & Eileen M Ahlin (2018) “The impact of race and extra-legal factors in charging
defendants with serious sexual assault: Findings from a five-year study of one Pennsylvania court
jurisdiction” (2018) 16:2 Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 99.
87. See e.g. Andrea L Miller, “Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in Judicial DecisionMaking” (2018) 10:2 Social Psychological and Personality Science 227.
88. See e.g. the discussion in Akwasi Owusu-Bempah & Scot Wortley, “Race, Crime and Criminal
Justice in Canada” in Sandra Bucerius & Michael Tonry, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity,
Crime, and Immigration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
89. See e.g. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous factors in judicial
decisions” (2011) 108:17 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 6889, testing the legal realist trope that “justice is what the judge ate for breakfast” in the
context of judges making sequential parole decisions in Israeli courts, and concluding at 6890 that “the
likelihood of a favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food break
than later in the sequence of cases.” For additional discussion of some of these studies, see Daniel L
Chen, “Machine Learning and the Rule of Law” in Michael A Livermore & Daniel N Rockmore, eds,
Law as Data: Computation, Text and the Future of Legal Analysis (The SFI Press Seminar Series,
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provide reports showing that such factors meaningfully influence decisionmaking, it will be difficult for a justice system committed to judicial
impartiality and equality before the law to simply ignore this information.
Public perceptions of judicial competence may also be changed.
A judge is not required to have exhaustive, in-depth understanding of
every area of law or every discipline relevant to each case they hear, but
a certain level of competence is part of their professional obligations.90
What if, for example, a judicial analytics tool performs an analysis of the
language used in Judge D’s reasons and reveals that Judge D tends to rely
on a particular legal test which, although not technically overturned, is
not the leading legal test used by other judges in the jurisdiction? How
about a tool that shows that in one region of Ontario, judicially determined
reasonable notice periods in wrongful dismissal cases are on average 50
per cent lower than in another jurisdiction, for similar cases? It is not clear
that such results reveal, in fact, a lack of judicial competence. Judicial
independence and the common law system accommodate a range of
approaches. However, the public, upon having ready access to this type
of information across a multitude of data points, might become skeptical
about whether the legal system is yielding legally correct or fair decisions.
To the extent that mainstreamed judicial analytics tools reveal
significant and regular disparities in judicial practices, such revelations
will be in tension with concepts of judicial impartiality, equality before the
law and judicial competence. All of these ideals are core concepts in our
justice system. A powerful set of narratives—and, indeed, case law—is
built on the idea that the justice system, when operating properly, provides
similar results in similar cases: we are all to be treated equally under the
law. If judicial analytics tools provide ubiquitous information about how
case outcomes are influenced by a litigant’s race or gender, by external
issues like the weather, or by a judge’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the
law, the justice system will be forced to respond to a questioning public.

2019), online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302507> [https://perma.cc/DJ2T-3PBZ].
90. In the Matter of an Inquiry Pursuant to s. 63(1) of the Judges Act Regarding the Honourable
Justice Robin Camp: Report and Recommendation of the Inquiry Committee to the Canadian Judicial
Council (29 November 2016), online: Canadian Judicial Council <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/
general/Camp_Docs/2016-11-29%20CJC%20Camp%20Inquiry%20Committee%20Report.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/USK8-DD3A]: (the committee opined, “[j]udges cannot reasonably be expected to
have expertise in every discipline…which is precisely why expert witnesses are often called to assist
the judicial reasoning process” at para 165); see also Alice Woolley, “When Judicial Decisions Go
from Wrong to Wrongful—How Should the Legal System Respond?” (3 November 2015), online:
ABlawg.ca
<https://ablawg.ca/2015/11/03/when-judicial-decisions-go-from-wrong-to-wrongfulhow-should-the-legal-system-respond/> [https://perma.cc/RR5E-7R45].
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It is not clear what responses may be triggered but there are a number
of interesting possibilities. Will increased transparency into the work of
judges result in wide-spread reforms that respond to what becomes known
about judicial behaviour? Will the justice system have to reconsider its
deeply held commitments to judicial integrity and adopt a new ideal of the
judicial role? Will emerging concerns about human fallibility be used to
justify increased use of automated decision-making in judicial contexts?
Will easy access to data about judges simply result in “virtuosity in
measuring and comparing quantifiable variables...rather than an earnest
effort to advance our understanding” about judicial behaviour?91
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that increased transparency
is not a guaranteed result of greater access to judicial analytics tools.
Whether mainstreamed judicial analytics tools will lead to better public
insight about judging depends on both: (1) the quality of the information
that the tools output; and (2) the literacy of judicial analytics users.
Here, we can think of “quality” in several different respects. One
facet of quality is the quality of the data that is inputted into the tools.
Above, we noted the ways that the data set used by judicial analytics tools
may be incomplete and, in some cases, contain errors. However, even if
the highest quality data is inputted into the tools, this does not guarantee
that the information outputted by such tools is of a high quality. Stated
simply, it is possible for judicial analytics tools to be based on poorly or
incorrectly written code. If the numbers aren’t “crunched” correctly, then
the information reported by an analytics tool to the public about judicial
behaviour may be inaccurate. To date, the issue of quality has not been
prominent in the conversation about judicial analytics. High barriers to
entry into the market have generally meant that only serious and wellfunded actors are able to produce and provide such tools.92 However,
if judicial analytics tools become mainstreamed, as we predict, and are
cheaper to create and deliver, there is more risk of poorly developed tools.
Moreover, even if the best data is inputted and analyzed correctly, user
misunderstandings can still result if statistical information is not presented
with sufficient context. For example, a judicial analytics tool could report
that Judge E has a record of denying bail to racialized individuals accused
of crimes in 80 per cent of cases, in contrast to their colleagues who deny
bail to racialized individuals in 50 per cent to 60 per cent of cases. If a
91. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978) at 7.
92. The providers of some of the most prominent tools—LexisNexis, Westlaw and Bloomberg—are
all very large companies.
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member of the public is simply given these two numbers, that person might
be concerned about the fairness of Judge E adjudicating bail decisions
involving racialized individuals. But these two numbers do not tell the
whole story. Proper interpretation of statistics depends on knowing the full
context including, for example, whether Judge E is newly appointed and
has only presided over five bail hearings versus their colleagues, who have
presided over an average of 300 hearings each.
Similarly, an analytics tool may show that Judge F has a higher rate
of dissent than their colleagues at the same court or level of court. Absent
further context, and without a clear understanding of the meaning of
judicial dissent and its role in our judicial system, a member of the public
may interpret this to mean that Judge F is aberrant, or incompetent, when
in fact we know that dissent plays a critical role in our justice system and
is by no means a reflection of the fitness of a dissenting judge.93 When
patterns about judicial behaviour are presented by academics, they are
likely to be accompanied by pages of explanatory text and context.94 The
challenge with analytics tools meant for public use is that there is much
more incentive to present users with a quickly digestible “bottom-line”
statistical percentage or other numerical value, without the necessary
context.
To summarize, a key potential benefit for the public of mainstreamed
judicial analytics tools is increased transparency about judicial behaviour,
but this is neither a guaranteed nor uncomplicated benefit. Issues of
information quality and user literacy exist. To the extent that those practical
issues can be addressed, the resulting transparency about the work of judges
is likely to generate systemic challenges to the legal system’s commitments
to judicial impartiality, equality before the law, and judicial competence.
If the legal system cannot rise to these challenges, the public’s confidence
in the administration of justice may suffer. On the flip side, the disruption
that judicial analytics tools may invite to entrenched presumptions about
the work of judging could provide new and profound avenues to improve
our processes and our understanding of the judicial role with a view to
improving Canadians’ access to fair and equal justice.

93. On the role and importance of dissent see e.g. Peter W Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, “Why Judges
Should Dissent” (2017) 67:2 UTLJ 126; Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of
the Future?” (2000) 38:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 495.
94. See Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30; Rehaag, “Refugee
Determinations,” supra note 33.
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2. The judiciary
Increased transparency about judicial behaviour is also likely to have direct
effects on judges themselves and on the work of judging. In this section,
we explore opportunities for judicial education as a potential benefit of
judicial analytics. We also caution that increased attention to the details of
judicial behaviour may influence the work of judging and the well-being
of judges in unintended ways and may have disparate consequences for
certain judges.
Just as mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may provide better
information to the public about judicial practices, they may also provide
useful insights to judges about themselves. Reports from judicial analytics
tools have the potential to reveal patterns in a judge’s work about which
that judge might be otherwise unaware.95 Judges can use this information
for self-reflection and seek to improve on their practices, where analytics
suggest that is necessary. Indeed, the European ethical Charter on the
use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment
recognizes that judicial analytics tools could be beneficial to the extent
that they “offer[] judges a more detailed quantitative and qualitative
assessment of their activities…with a purely informative aim of assisting
in decision-making.”96 Of course, whether such benefits result from
mainstreamed judicial analytics will depend again on the quality of the
reports produced by judicial analytics tools and the ability of judges to
translate the information presented in those reports into meaningful
changes to their professional practices. Additionally, judges need to be
receptive to the information available to them.
Not all of the changes in judicial practices that analytics tools might
motivate are positive. It seems possible, for example, that judges could try
to game the system in order to improve their analytics scores. While we
might want a judge to change their behaviour if confronted with material
evidence of unfairness or bias in their decisions, what about other types of
behavioural changes? Studies have demonstrated that in the United States,
“federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences” and alter their
judicial decision-making in the name of advancing their careers.97 What if
95. For further discussion on using judicial analytics to educate judges, see e.g. Chen, supra note 89.
96. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, European ethical Charter on the use of
Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment, Adopted at the 31st plenary meeting
of the CEPEJ, Strasbourg, 3-4 December 2018 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe: 2019), online:
<https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c> [https://perma.
cc/5ZK8-5VXT] at 66.
97. Ryan C Black & Ryan J Owens, “Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter their
Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court” (2016) 60:1 American Journal of Political Science
30, show that when there is a vacancy on the United States Supreme Court, judges contending for
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judges injected their decisions with a search engine optimization (SEO)like strategy where specific words, phrases or cases are used to produce
decisions that would be viewed more favourably in a judicial analytics
report? This kind of strategizing could seriously undermine the integrity
of judicial decision-making.
Beyond cynical concerns about judges modifying their behaviour for
career advancement or improved analytics stats, there are subtler—and
more likely—risks. Although judges are insulated by judicial independence,
the desire to conform can be a powerful influence on behaviour.98 For
instance, if a judicial analytics tool indicates that Judge G’s record is
“abnormal” in some regard in comparison to their colleagues, Judge G
may consciously or unconsciously be moved to change course and render
decisions more in line with their colleagues. Whether conformity in any
given case is a good or bad thing is a complicated question that depends
on the facts of a case, the nature of the law at issue and one’s view of the
proper role of judging in a common law system. Our point here is simply
that the information produced by judicial analytics tools may impact the
judicial decision-making process in myriad ways.
Another perspective through which to consider the impact of judicial
analytics tools on judges is as a new form of workplace surveillance. To be
sure, judges in Canada are no strangers to scrutiny of their work; appellate
courts, the press and the academy routinely review and critique judicial
decisions. To the extent, however, that the inputs into judicial analytics
tools come to include video and audio of court proceedings, a more intense
level of scrutiny may well result. Statistical analyses of judges’ in-court
behaviour have been performed before, primarily by academics and with
the use of significant resources. For example, in 1978, two academics
conducted a study of judges’ non-verbal behaviour in courtrooms;
specifically, they recorded the number of times judges gazed for more
or less than two seconds at defendants, civilian witnesses, and police
witnesses by having observers sit in court and observe 138 witnesses
over a two-month period.99 Much of the resulting analysis focused on

elevation to the Supreme Court are more likely to “vote consistently with the president’s preferences,
to rule in favor of the United States and to write dissenting opinions” when compared to judges who
are not contenders for promotion to the Supreme Court.
98. Cass R Sunstein, “Conformity and Dissent” (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 34, 2002) at 14 (citations omitted), online: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=public_law_and_legal_theory> [https://perma.cc/DJK7KYC2].
99. Edwina Dorch & Gary Fontaine, “Rate of Judges’ Gaze at Different Types of Witnesses” (1978)
46:3 Perceptual and Motor Skills 1103.
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differences in how long Black and white judges looked at certain classes
of witnesses.100
Mainstreamed judicial analytics tools could someday have the potential
to produce this kind of behavioural information routinely and with little
cost. If so, judges will be entering a new world of surveillance—arguably
a world of hyper-surveillance—much different than they have experienced
before.101 Recent commentary and studies have emphasized how increased
workplace surveillance can lead to negative effects on workers’ subjective
sense of wellbeing and can lead to unintended behaviours such as attempts
to hide one’s work from the surveillance system where possible.102 How
such effects might manifest in relation to surveilling judges’ work in the
courtroom is hard to predict, but it seems reasonable to be concerned about
the risk of unintended and potentially negative effects.
Framing judicial analytics tools as a form of surveillance highlights
another risk: scrutiny facilitated by judicial analytics tools will be used in a
disproportionately punitive fashion against racialized and other “outsider
judges.”103 In the social sciences, there is a rich literature demonstrating
the many ways that differently-situated “people are exposed differently to
the dangers of surveillance.”104 There are numerous examples of intense
scrutiny of racialized judges who reference or challenge racism in the
legal system.105 Might new judicial surveillance technologies (i.e. judicial
100. The researchers, ibid at 1103, reported their results “indicate: (1) a main effect for judges’ race
with a higher rate of gaze from white judges than [B]lack judges, (2) a main effect for type of witness
with defendants receiving the highest rate of gaze followed by civilian, then police, witnesses, (3) an
interaction of judges’ race by type of witness with white judges gazing at the highest rate at police and
black judges gazing at the lowest rate at police, (4) an interaction of judges’ race by witnesses’ race
with black judges gazing at the highest rate at white witnesses and white judges at the highest rate at
black witnesses, (5) a positive correlation of 0.48 between the rate of gaze at the defendant and the fine
received if found guilty.”
101. Sarah Griffiths, “Hyper-surveillance” (21 July 2019), online: Worklife 101 <https://www.bbc.
com/worklife/article/20190718-hyper-surveillance> [https://perma.cc/B4WS-SXV2].
102. Anna Borg, “Impact of electronic surveillance in the workplace” (31 July 2014), online:
Eurofound
<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2014/impact-of-electronicsurveillance-in-the-workplace> [https://perma.cc/GAM8-DUFQ].
103. The authors thank Professor Jane Bailey for raising the issue explored in this paragraph. The
idea of “outsider” judges draws on the work of Mari J Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim’s Story” (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320 at 2323, who uses the phrase “outsider
jurisprudence” to describe the academic work of feminist and racialized scholars; and from Natasha
Bakht et al, “Counting Outsiders: A Critical Exploration of Outsider Course Enrollment in Canadian
Legal Education” (2007) 45:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 667 at 672, who use the term “…outsider to describe
those who are members of groups that have historically lacked power in society or have traditionally
been outside the realms of fashioning, teaching, and adjudicating the law.”
104. Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2019).
105. See e.g. the allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias against African-Canadian Judge
Corinne Sparks in: R v S(RD), supra note 83; and associated commentary: Sherene Razack, “RDS
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analytics tools) be “weaponized” in a way that results in disproportionately
negative impacts on racialized and other “outsider judges”? This possibility
demands our attention.
A final possible effect worthy of consideration relates to judicial
competence. If information produced by judicial analytics tools is
increasingly used as evidence in legal proceedings—for example, if parties
begin to bring judicial disqualification motions on the basis of reports
produced by judicial analytics tools—will this impose new competence
requirements on judges? What level of understanding will judges need
to have about these tools—for instance, what the tools do, the pitfalls of
analytics, etc.—in order to preside over such motions? Even if evidence
created by judicial analytics tools is submitted through experts, judges
will need to have a basic degree of familiarity with analytics tools to
meaningfully assess the evidence. Some commentators have argued that
judges should be subject to a duty of technological competence.106 Indeed,
proposed revisions to the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles
for Judges state that “judges should develop and maintain some proficiency
with technology related to the nature and performance of judicial duties.”107
The ability of judges to scrutinize statistics and conclusions generated by
judicial analytics tools seems particularly important given that, as noted
above, this information is prone to being misunderstood or taken out of
context.
Just as mainstreamed judicial analytics is likely to alter how the
public sees the work of judging, this technology is also poised to change
how judges themselves see the work they do. A key potential benefit for
judges is educative; with better information about judicial behaviours,
judges can work to address undesirable behaviours, like implicit bias. At
the same time, this increased insight also carries risks that judges might
v Her Majesty the Queen: A Case About Home” (1998) 9:3 Constitutional Forum; and Richard F
Devlin, “We Can’t Go on Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective
in R v RDS” (1995) 18 Dalhousie LJ 408. See also a recent example from the UK: Peter Herbert, “UK
justice system is racist, suggests one of Britain’s only non-white judges” Independent (10 January
2017), online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-justice-system-racist-ethnicminority-judges-peter-herbert-lutfur-rahman-tower-hamlets-a7518176.html>
[https://perma.cc/
T9Y8-LS6P].
106. See e.g. Amy Salyzyn, “Modern Courts and the Need for Judicial Technological Competence”
(18 June 2019), online: Slaw.ca <http://www.slaw.ca/2019/06/18/modern-courts-and-the-need-forjudicial-technological-competence/> [https://perma.cc/3N7M-92GU]; and Robert Ambrogi, “It’s
Time to Extend the Duty of Tech Competence to Judges” (6 May 2019), online: Above the Law
<https://abovethelaw.com/2019/05/it-is-time-to-extend-the-duty-of-tech-competence-to-judges/>
[https://perma.cc/X7UU-ZPL6].
107. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges: Discussion Draft, November 20, 2019,
online (pdf): <https://cjc-ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2019/EPJ%20-%20PDJ%202019-1120.pdf> [https://perma.cc/XW3K-L5CG] at 3.C.4.
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intentionally or unintentionally alter their behaviours in undesirable ways.
Additionally, the surveillance necessary to produce analytics-generated
insights could have negative impacts on the well-being of judges or be
disproportionately deployed against certain groups of judges. If and how
these effects might manifest in a world of mainstreamed judicial analytics
is uncertain. Clearer is the fact that judges will unlikely be able to ignore
this technology completely, as it becomes more routinely referenced on
matters that they must adjudicate.
3. Lawyers
Likewise, lawyers—or at least litigators—will not be able to ignore judicial
analytics tools if and when this technology becomes mainstreamed. This
section focuses on how judicial analytics tools may engage lawyers’
professional obligations.
The potential consequences for lawyers relate primarily to competence.
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s Model Code of Professional
Conduct includes commentary noting that a lawyer’s duty of competence
requires “an understanding of, and ability to use, technology relevant to
the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice and responsibilities.”108 There
is no detailed list of the kinds of technology a lawyer must use competently
to fulfill this obligation. Rather, the duty is expressly contextual, with
the relevant commentary referring only to an obligation to use such
technology that is “relevant to the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice
and responsibilities” and which is “reasonably available.”109 This language
echoes the well-settled standard of care in a negligence action against a
lawyer, which is that of the “reasonably competent” lawyer.110
If clients are in a situation where they have the ability to choose
their judge or bring a motion to have an assigned judge disqualified, and
judicial analytics tools can produce relevant information, then the use of
judicial analytics has a clear benefit to these clients. As judicial analytics
tools become ubiquitous, they will presumably become “relevant” and
“reasonably available” to litigators such that there is an obligation to use
such tools, pursuant to both professional codes of conduct and common
law standards of care.
An analogy can be drawn to using electronic databases to conduct
legal research. Several decades ago, it was accepted practice for lawyers
108. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct at Rule 3.1-2,
Commentary 4A, online: <https://flsc.ca/interactivecode/> [https://perma.cc/4KB4-PDX5#code-0_1]
[Model Code].
109. Ibid at Commentary 4B.
110. See Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at para 58 31 DLR (4th) 481.
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to rely on print case reporters; now, a failure to use electronic databases
to conduct legal research can amount to lawyer incompetence.111 The tools
that lawyers are expected to use to provide competent client representation
evolve as the available technologies expand and become more widely
used. Although clients and courts do not now expect lawyers to employ
judicial analytics tools, this may change.112
A related question concerns the kinds of ethical obligations, if any,
lawyers might have in relying on or presenting statistics about an individual
judge in court. Current rules impose a duty on lawyers to “encourage
public respect for and try to improve the administration of justice.”113
Commentary to this duty explicitly notes that “proceedings and decisions
of courts and tribunals are properly subject to scrutiny and criticism by all
members of the public, including lawyers” while also cautioning lawyers
to “avoid criticism that is petty, intemperate or unsupported by a bona
fide belief in its real merit.”114 This rule and its commentary were drafted
without judicial analytics tools in mind. Does the rise of analytics tools
generate new or unique tensions with lawyers’ ethical obligations? For
example, should there be a certain standard that a judicial analytics tool
must meet before information from that tool can be presented as evidence
in open court (and, thus made part of the public record)?
Similarly, should there be any restraints on how lawyers refer to
information from analytics tools in speaking with the media? Lawyers are
permitted under current rules to speak to the media about a client’s case if
it is “in the best interests of the client and in the scope of the retainer” and
does not otherwise interfere with a party’s right to a fair trial or hearing.115
111. In Aram Systems Ltd v NovAtel Inc, 2010 ABQB 152 at para 23 CanLII, a trial court in Alberta
described the shift in the following terms:
…I think that the view of computerized legal research as a mere alternative is no longer
consonant with the reality of current legal practice. Such research is now expected of
counsel, both by their clients, who look to counsel to put forth the best possible case,
and by the courts, who rely upon counsel to present the most relevant authorities. Indeed,
it might be argued that a lawyer who chooses to forgo computerized legal research is
negligent in doing so….The practice of law has evolved to the point where computerized
legal research is no longer a matter of choice.
112. Ed Walters, “The Model Rules of Autonomous Conduct: Ethical Responsibilities of Lawyers and
Artificial Intelligence” (2019) 35 Georgia State U L Rev 1073 at 1078, citing in part James Summers,
“Professional and Ethical Traps for Technophobes and Technoweenies” (January 2004), online
(pdf): Mem B Ass’n J <http://www.allensummers.com/sites/396/uploaded/files/Professional_Traps_
Jan_2004.pdf> [https://perma.cc/EE4S-EE2S], writes: “Many lawyers are just learning about [new
artificial intelligence tools available to lawyers, including judicial analytics tools] for the first time,
but if they are not yet the state of the art in legal-service delivery, it is clear that they soon will be the
‘standard of competent practitioners.’”
113. Model Code, supra note 108 at r. 5.6-1.
114. Ibid at r. 5.6-1, Commentary [3].
115. Ibid at r. 7.5-1 and r. 7.5-2.
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Could a defence lawyer hold a press conference after her client is convicted
and sentenced in a criminal matter, in which they refer to information from
a judicial analytics tool that suggests that the trial judge has a history of
bias against individuals belonging to the same community as the lawyer’s
client? Assuming that the lawyer’s tone was professional, such comments
would not necessarily be “petty, intemperate or unsupported by a bona fide
belief in its real merit” and thus discouraged by the current rule requiring
lawyers to encourage public respect for the administration of justice.116
Could judicial analytics become part of a lawyer’s media strategy?
As was the case with the public and the judiciary, the legal profession
will face opportunities and challenges when judicial analytics tools
become mainstreamed. Most importantly, lawyers will have to understand
how to use these tools to benefit clients in ways that are consistent with
their professional obligations in relation to the administration of justice.
V. Responses to judicial analytics
The above discussion details a variety of potential consequences of
mainstreamed judicial analytics. Potential benefits of mainstreamed
judicial analytics include increased transparency about judicial behaviour
and new opportunities for judicial education. Risks associated with the
mainstreaming of judicial analytics include the development of poorquality tools and negative effects on judges or certain groups of judges as
a result of increased surveillance.
This final part briefly explores possible responses to these potential
consequences from a policy standpoint. We frame this discussion through
two questions: (1) should judicial analytics tools be regulated? and (2) how
should judicial regulators respond to mainstreamed judicial analytics?
1. Should judicial analytics tools be regulated?
As noted in the introduction, we do not believe that a French-style ban
would be appropriate in Canada: the public should be able to analyze
public information. Canadian researchers would rightfully sound the
alarm if the government prohibited them from analyzing patterns in
judicial decisions using conventional (i.e. non-analytics-based) methods;
the fact that such analyses may be easier to do with judicial analytics tools
does not change the essential nature of the task, it just makes it faster
and potentially yields additional insights. There is also the question of the
legality of banning analytics, since prohibiting the publication of patterns

116. Ibid.

278 The Dalhousie Law Journal

in otherwise public information would seem to run afoul of the freedom of
expression guarantee in the Charter.117
In addition to these normative and legal reasons against a ban, there
are also reasons why we might want to encourage the development and use
of judicial analytics tools. As discussed in Part IV, above, judicial analytics
tools have the potential to facilitate unprecedented transparency about the
work of judging in Canada, which is undoubtedly a good worth pursuing.
So, if not a ban on judicial analytics, is some type of regulatory
response prudent? Given the potential development of poor-quality tools,
a risk identified above, one reason to regulate judicial analytics tools could
be to provide some type of quality assurance. If judicial analytics are
mainstreamed and the public has easy access, it will be important that the
information that the public receives is accurate and otherwise trustworthy,
which requires that the tools that produce analytics reports are reliable.
There are several reasons, however, that a regulatory regime may not
be the best vehicle for addressing quality assurance issues. First, it is not
clear who should serve as the regulator of judicial analytics. There is an
ongoing debate about whether lawyer regulators—law societies, in Canada
—have jurisdiction to regulate legal technology products.118 Historically,
this debate has been framed in terms of whether a technology tool simply
provides legal information (and thus is not within the jurisdictional ambit
of lawyer regulators) or whether it provides a legal service or provides
advice that amounts to the practice of law. Given that judicial analytics
tools, which amalgamate and report statistical information about a judge’s
past decisions, are not providing legal services, answering legal questions,
or acting as “robot lawyers” before a court or tribunal, law societies do not
have a plausible jurisdictional claim to regulate them.
What about the government? Existing consumer protection laws might
provide some defense against particularly egregious issues arising from
poor-quality analytics tools but are not well placed to facilitate proactive
measures of quality assurance.119 Another option might be for legislators
to pass a new, targeted law tailored to the specifics of judicial analytics.
In July 2019, California passed a law requiring “chatbots” to disclose that
they are not human.120 Rather than create a new regulator, the California
117. Charter, supra note 76 at s 2(b).
118. See e.g. the discussion in Teresa Scassa et al, “Developing Privacy Best Practices for Direct-toPublic Legal Apps: Observations and Lessons Learned, (2020) 18(1) CJLT [forthcoming].
119. For example, s 9(1) of Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Sched A:
a supplier “is deemed to warrant that the services supplied under a consumer agreement are of a
reasonably acceptable quality.”
120. For more details, see Renee DiResta, “A New Law Makes Bots Identify Themselves—That’s the
Problem” (24 July 2019), online: Wired.com <https://www.wired.com/story/law-makes-bots-identify-
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law allows the Attorney General to enforce and seek civil penalties under
existing consumer protection laws.121 However, regulating the quality of
diverse judicial analytics tools is doubtless a more complicated endeavour
than simply requiring a disclosure notice, as with the California chatbot
law. The complexity involved raises questions about whether government
regulation is sufficiently nimble and appropriately informed about judicial
analytics to be effective.
Additionally, questions about constitutionality linger in the
government regulation space, even if such regulation does not amount to
a full ban. As emphasized above, the function of judicial analytics tools is
to provide descriptive analyses of publicly available data; once the data is
made public through the publication of judicial decisions and other court
records, it seems like government overreach to try to control the specifics
of how that information can be used.
Finally, even if a proportionate government regime passed constitutional
scrutiny, it is not clear that there would be government appetite to enter the
regulatory fray. Judicial analytics tools—even if they are “mainstreamed,”
as we predict they will be—are still a niche technological market. This is
unlike, for example, new technologies with broader reach, like drones or
autonomous vehicles, which are much more likely to attract government
attention.
One quality assurance option outside of the regulatory landscape
that is often discussed in the context of legal technologies is voluntary
third-party certification.122 This method would convene a group of experts
to develop appropriate standards and procedures to evaluate the quality
of judicial analytics tools. Providers of judicial analytics tools could be
incentivized to participate in the certification process with the promise of
being able to use a trustmark if they meet the required standards. The value
of a trustmark to legal technology providers is the ability to easily signal
to the public that they are providing a high-quality tool. The public would
also benefit from this signalling: they could quickly distinguish which
judicial analytics tools have met certain standards and which have not.
Although not commonly employed in the legal sector, the concept of
industry standards and private certification is well developed in other fields.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for example, “has
published 23037 international standards and related documents, covering
themselves/> [https://perma.cc/YQV8-9K2B].
121. Ibid.
122. See e.g. discussion in Susan Saab Fortney, “Online Legal Document Providers and the Public
Interest: Using a Certification Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection” (2019) 72
Oklahoma L Rev 91; and Scassa et al, supra note 118.
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almost every industry, from technology, to food safety, to agriculture and
healthcare.”123 In the area of technology, the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Association is also active, with
a “portfolio of over 1,900 active standards and over 650 standards under
development.”124
A major downside to the case for private certification is cost. Although
the market in judicial analytics tools is likely to grow, it is not a large market,
relatively speaking. A private certification model specifically tailored
to judicial analytics tools may well not be economically sustainable. If
certification is expensive, it may not make economic sense for a provider
to pursue a trustmark. Likewise, if only providers of high-end, expensive
tools can afford certification, then it may only be lawyers or institutional
users who will benefit from this model of quality assurance, as opposed to
the general public.
We tend to favour a public model: a non-profit legal organization
should develop high quality, free judicial analytics tools for public use.
In Canada, we have precedents for this model in the contexts of both
legal documents and legal information. With respect to legal documents,
there have long been commercial providers who marketed electronic legal
forms to the public with a view to making the forms more accessible
and user friendly.125 Increasingly, however, non-profit organizations and
courts are developing their own free versions of electronic, interactive
legal documents.126 Regarding legal information, although Canadians
have access to commercial legal research databases like Westlaw and
LexisNexis, we also benefit from the Canadian Legal Information Institute
(CanLII), which is funded by Canadian lawyers and notaries and provides
free, public access to Canadian jurisprudence and legislation.127

123. “About ISO,” online: The International Organization for Standardization < https://www.iso.org/
about-us.html> [https://perma.cc/8VCQ-FJXS].
124. The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, Ethically Aligned
Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (First
Edition, 2019), online (pdf): <https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/
documents/other/ead/ead-for-business.pdf?utm_medium=undefined&utm_source=undefined&utm_
campaign=undefined&utm_content=undefined&utm_term=undefined> [https://perma.cc/V3NT74NX] at 287.
125. See e.g. Law Depot, <https://www.lawdepot.ca/> [https://perma.cc/47LU-C3AN].
126. See e.g. CLEO Family Law Guided Pathways, <https://stepstojustice.ca/family-law-guidedpathways/about> [https://perma.cc/SA8H-97PF]; and Legal Info Nova Scotia Wills App, <https://
www.legalinfo.org/apps/welcome-to-our-last-will-and-testament-app> [https://perma.cc/Q263PVMV].
127. “What’s CanLII?,” online: CanLII <https://www.canlii.org/en/info/about.html> [https://perma.
cc/B54M-PGXR].
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A public model delinks quality assurance from commercial incentives
and provides a free, trusted option that is available to everyone. The
degree to which this might be a realistic approach for judicial analytics
tools depends on whether, in future, the creation of such tools becomes
less resource-intensive. The cost of developing or maintaining a public
judicial analytics tool may be too high to be appealing or even possible to
pursue. If costs were reduced, however, a public option is an interesting
possibility.
2. How should judicial regulators respond to mainstreamed judicial
analytics?
Concerns about judicial impartiality and competence arising from
mainstreamed judicial analytics may also engage judicial regulators.
Judicial regulators could play an important role in helping to harness
the potential educative benefits of judicial analytics tools and protecting
judges from some of the negative impacts of increased scrutiny.
As detailed in Part IV above, concerns about judicial impartiality can
be addressed within individual legal cases when a party makes a motion
to have a judge disqualified for a reasonable apprehension of bias. But
judicial councils in Canada also play an important role in addressing
public concerns about judicial impartiality and judicial competence. More
particularly, these councils are authorized “to receive and investigate
complaints against judges, to hold discipline hearings, and recommend or
impose discipline on judges.”128 How should this authority be exercised
if judicial councils receive complaints about judges based on a pattern of
bias or incompetence gleaned from a judicial analytics tool?
In certain respects, addressing complaints based on data from judicial
analytics tools need not be any different than addressing other types of
complaints. An initial step is to determine the validity of the information
contained in the complaint. In the case of complaints based on information
from judicial analytics tools, this requires the regulator to be able to assess
the veracity of that information. Assuming that the regulator can be assured
of the quality of the information generated by the tool—whether through
regulatory standards, a certification regime, a trusted public source or its
own independent assessment—then the question becomes how should a
regulator react when judicial analytics tools reveal patterns suggesting
judicial bias or incompetence?

128. Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, “’Fighting Words’: Regulating judges in Canada” in
Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, eds, Regulating Judges: Beyond Independence and Accountability
(Massachusetts: Edwards Elgar Publishing, 2016) 76 at 89.
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Doing nothing is indefensible: if a judicial analytics tool provides
credible information about problematic judging then a response is
required to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. The fact that
the information comes from a judicial analytics tool does not justify the
regulator putting its head in the sand. At the same time, it will be important
that judicial regulators react proportionately to such information. In many
cases, it may be too extreme to remove a judge from the bench even if there
are real problems in relation to the particular judge; targeted educational
measures may be a more effective and fairer response.129 Indeed, Daniel
Chen has suggested that judges could be offered targeted training programs
“either with the goal of de-biasing or to help them learn how to use the
hearing process to better advantage.”130 Chen also notes that “simply
alerting judges to the fact that their behavior is highly predictable in ways
that may indicate unfairness may be sufficient to change their behavior.”131
In addition to interventions targeting individual judges, judicial
councils or established judicial education institutions, like the National
Judicial Institute,132 might undertake more proactive, general educative
activities using information obtained from judicial analytics tools. For
example, Chen also suggests that judicial education could be used “to
expose judges to findings concerning the effects of legally relevant and
legally irrelevant factors on decisions, with the goal of general rather than
specific debiasing.”133
Once again, any educational benefit inspired by a judicial analytics
tool depends to a significant degree on how receptive a judge is to the
insights offered by analytics. However, if this type of information is
routinely included as part of judicial education efforts, it may be possible
to engender more buy-in from individual judges. Such educative efforts
could be directed not only to informing judges about insights generated
by judicial analytics tools but also to educating judges about the tools
themselves so that they are more knowledgeable and comfortable if and
129. We recognize that not all judicial regulators in Canada have the authority to order this type of
sanction. For example, the Canadian Judicial Council, which has authority over federally-appointed
judges in Canada, is currently limited to recommending to the federal Minister of Justice that the judge
be removed (Judges Act, RSC, 1985, c J-1, s 65(2)). That said, it has been argued that, in the case of the
Canadian Judicial Council, the range of sanctions for misconduct short of removal should be expanded
and hopefully we will see this type of reform in the near future. Moreover, some provincial judicial
regulators of judges already have the power to order educational measures (Courts of Justice Act, RSO
1990, Ch C43 at s 51.11).
130. Danziger, Levav & Avnaim-Pesso, supra note 89 at 5.
131. Ibid.
132. “About the NJI,” online: National Judicial Institute <https://www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/about/
about-the-nji/> [https://perma.cc/A8W3-J9K7].
133. Ibid at 7.
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when results from judicial analytics tools are presented as evidence in
court.
In addition to education, are there other proactive ways for judicial
regulators to address problems revealed by judicial analytics tools? One
option might be to conduct performance evaluations informed, at least
in part, by information provided by a judicial analytics tool. Judges are
not subject to any formal evaluations in Canada,134 although in some
cases, there is explicit statutory authority to do so.135 As Adam Dodek and
Richard Devlin note in their review of the regulation of judges in Canada,
performance evaluations can raise concerns about judicial independence,
but “such objections would be significantly reduced—although not
eliminated—if the evaluation was internal and confidential, i.e. performed
by the Chief Justice or the Associate Chief Justice of the court.”136
Finally, we might consider the role that judges, collectively, could play
in addressing some of the potentially negative impacts of judicial analytics
tools. For example, to mitigate concerns about decontextualized statistics,
the judiciary could amplify its public education efforts on the practice of
judging and the role of the courts, so that certain types of statistics (for
example, the rate at which an appellate judge dissents) are understood by
the public in their proper context.137 Similarly, as a way of guarding against
undue pressures to conform, judicial bodies could enhance their existing
efforts to educate the public about the importance of judicial independence
in our legal system.138
More challenging questions arise in relation to how judicial regulators
might mitigate any negative impacts on the well-being of judges resulting
from their being subjected to new and potentially invasive surveillance or
guard against the deployment of judicial analytics tools to target racialized
and other “outsider” judges.139 Being aware of these risks and educating
judges about their potential is surely a good first step. Depending on the
degree to which these risks manifest themselves, judicial regulators and
134. See Devlin & Dodek, supra note 128 at 94: concluding, “[w]e are unaware of any formal
evaluation processes of judges in Canada, at any level.”
135. For example, in Ontario, the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43 at s 51.11 (1) provides:
“The Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice may establish a program of performance evaluation
for provincial judges, and may implement the program when it has been reviewed and approved by the
Judicial Council.”
136. Devlin & Dodek, supra note 128 at 94.
137. An example of a current initiative is the “Judges in Canada” Youtube Channel which is
maintained by the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association, online: YouTube <https://www.
youtube.com/channel/UCmZ-ODLaJDDQjXmqWLKuu_Q/about> [https://perma.cc/2L8Z-HSPN].
138. See e.g. “Judicial Independence,” online: Canadian Judicial Council <https://cjc-ccm.ca/en/
what-we-do/judicial-independence> [https://perma.cc/5JBL-9WBG].
139. Matsuda, supra note 103; Bakht et al, supra note 103.
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other judicial bodies—like judges’ associations—may need to take steps to
defend judges’ privacy and equality interests, even where doing so surfaces
tensions with commitments to open courts and judicial transparency.
Conclusion
Judicial analytics tools should not be banned in Canada. Prohibiting analysis
of public information about judges is overbroad and inconsistent with our
commitments to open courts and freedom of expression. Moreover, to the
extent that analytics can encourage more transparency about the work
of judging, the technology may contribute to: (1) improving the work
of judges; (2) democratizing information about judges and courts; and
(3) increasing civic engagement with the legal system. Yet, as with any new
technology, there are likely to be unintended consequences that accompany
the rise of judicial analytics. These necessitate careful consideration and
response.
In this article, we presented a preliminary exploration of some of the
likely effects of mainstreamed judicial analytics for the public, lawyers and
the judiciary. We also considered responses that might mitigate concerns
related to the quality of judicial analytics tools and queried how judicial
regulators might use information from these tools in their work. While
only time will tell how the rise of judicial analytics will change the legal
system and impact its stakeholders, what is certain is that analytics will
continue to influence the delivery of legal services, the work of judges and
the public’s interaction with the legal system in myriad ways. As we have
argued in this article, this inevitability necessitates ongoing attention and
analysis.

